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Alex Law
The descent into dystopiaUtopia has been out of fashion for some time. It 
has long since been replaced by images of human 
catastrophe and survival struggles. Five hundred 
years ago, Thomas More’s original Utopia imagined 
a more civilised but highly controlled form of society 
in the context of extremely violent and dangerous 
power imbalances between ruler and ruled in his own 
society. Today, when power imbalances have lessened 
significantly, utopia is routinely derided as irrelevant, 
sentimental or fanciful. Fostered by the insecurities, 
fears and threats of neoliberal crisis, war, terrorism, 
climate change, and pandemics, critics like Frederic 
Jameson, Slavoj Zizek and Mark Fisher famously 
declared that it is ‘easier to imagine the end of the 
world than to imagine the end of capitalism’. 
This reversal is not as recent as is often assumed. 
Literary dystopias appeared initially in the wake of the 
French Revolution but the genre, and associated sub-
genres, only really developed in the late nineteenth 
century with rising fears of acute class divisions, science 
and technology. By the turn of the twentieth century, 
wishful literary utopias, such as the classless society 
depicted by William Morris’s News from Nowhere 
(1890), began to be supplanted by disillusioned fearful 
utopias, most famously the de-civilised worlds of H.G. 
Wells in The Time Machine (1895) and The Island of Dr 
Moreau (1895).
 
When the term ‘Utopia’ is invoked today it is often in 
a semi-ironic way, for instance, as the title of Hassan 
Nazer’s 2013 film about the prospects for widening 
circles of identification to the level of global humanity 
or John Pilger’s 2013 documentary film about the 
unrelieved suffering of Aboriginal people in Australia 
(Robb and Murphy, 2016). ‘Utopia’ is also the unironic 
appellation applied to an annual film festival in 
Greenbelt, Maryland in the States, which screens a wide 
range of independent films addressing utopia-dystopia 
themes.
The early decades of the transition to hegemonic 
literary dystopias coincided with the emergence of 
cinema as a popular medium following the public 
screening of short films in 1895. Early cinema briefly 
revitalised utopian ideals in the form of science fiction 
fantasy, typically transcending earthly conditions 
through the visual spectacle of a fantastic voyage to 
distant planets, most famously Georges Méliès’ A 
Trip to the Moon (1902) and The Impossible Voyage 
(1904). Distant planets did not long remain a cause 
for utopian escape. The Soviet film Aelita (Protazanov, 
1924) depicted Mars as an advanced capitalist tyranny, 
a dystopian device taken further and more famously by 
Metropolis (Lang, 1927). 
As illustrated by Metropolis, optimistic utopias 
became increasingly ambivalent about images of 
technological and scientific progress that could equally 
serve barbaric purposes as they could civilisational 
ones. This focus was fused in the twentieth century 
with fears of bureaucratic despotism crushing human 
autonomy, a genre defined by Yevgeny Zamyatin’s 
We (1924), Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932) 
and George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). A 
major strain of such dystopian imagery consisted of 
a high-functioning, governing apparatus hell-bent 
on hierarchical manipulation and controls to impose 
order, harmony and unity on submissive or rebellious 
individuals and groups. 
The growing predominance of fearful utopias has 
shifted in recent decades from these centrally-
controlled state societies to ones where a centralised 
monopoly of the means of violence has all but 
collapsed in post-apocalyptic scenarios of an 
unrestrained war of all against all, as in Cormac 
McCarthy’s 2006 novel and subsequent movie, The 
Road (Hillcoat, 2009). Post-apocalyptic dystopias 
are often more concerned to stimulate the affective 
responses of audiences than to question how coercive 
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systems or political regimes actually emerge, function 
or might be changed.
A natural fear of utopia?
Images of societal collapse now characterise a veritable 
deluge of dystopian videogames, television and 
film. While there is an ancient religious tradition of 
apocalypse reaching back millennia, contemporary 
fearful utopias are peculiar to increasingly complex and 
differentiated societies. Millenarian utopian movements 
gave way to apocalyptic imagery not only in response 
to sudden ruptures with the fabric of everyday routine 
rendered by capitalist crises, rapid technological 
innovation, warfare and revolution but also in response 
to more mundane experiences of life in the ‘lonely 
crowd’, felt to be deeply impersonal and alienating. 
The rebalancing of the utopia-dystopia continuum has 
been shaped by specific processes of increasing social 
complexity and differentiation. State and corporate 
authority, market exchange, urban density and mass 
communications generate unintended consequences 
that elude the purposeful control of individuals, groups 
and institutions. As insecurity becomes routine, it is 
experienced as an existential affront to collective self-
images of sovereign human autonomy. Alongside 
fears of science and technology and social breakdown 
as major preoccupations, a mounting sense of 
environmental crisis has further called into question 
machine civilisation and mass consumerism. 
Dystopia is often understood as part of a primal human 
condition of eternally recurring existential fears. After 
all, it may be argued, constant fear and paranoia have 
induced horror after horror throughout human history, 
from slavery, religious terror, political despotism, mob 
rule, concentration camps, witch-hunts, anti-Semitism, 
eugenics, and so on. In his wide-ranging study of more 
than one hundred and fifty literary dystopias of the 
past two centuries, Gregory Claeys (2016) adopts a 
naturalistic anthropology of an original and constantly 
recurring state of psychological anxiety as a permanent 
feature of the human condition. Collective fears are 
projected onto ‘enemies’ that both bind together the 
inner group and expel or destroy outsiders. Much of 
this argument relies on psychological theories of ‘the 
crowd’ in mass society proposed by Le Bon, Freud, 
Gasset and others who emphasise a supposedly 
‘primitive’ disposition for irrational ‘mental contagion’, 
hypnotic suggestibility or ‘transference’ of collective 
pathologies, atavistic impulses that malevolent 
charismatic leaders are only too ready to magnify and 
intensify.
‘Natural fears’ may be modified by social processes 
but can never be entirely dispelled. Fears of a ‘mental 
contagion’ were registered in the 1970s by a moral 
panic over the ‘meaningless violence’ increasingly 
tolerated by a ‘permissive’ popular culture. Here the 
film dystopia of A Clockwork Orange (Kubrick, 1970) 
was viewed as an especially egregious example. 
Anthony Burgess’s 1962 novel was intended as a 
critique of the dystopian loss of human autonomy 
promoted by then fashionable behaviourist 
psychology. Stanley Kubrick withdrew the film from 
UK cinemas in 1973 amidst fears of copycat violence, 
home invasions and rape inspired by the film’s scenes 
of youth brutality. Some worried that the fashion style 
of the young gang of ‘droogs’ in the film represented a 
subcultural transition from skinhead gangs to glam rock 
that was no less threatening to social order. Although 
young working-class males in the UK wore make-up 
and bowler hats as part of the ‘Clockwork gang style’ 
they continued to favour ‘bovver boots’ associated with 
skinhead violence (Kramer, 2011: 101-6). 
Politics of dystopia
The relationship between politics and utopia remains 
strained. Twenty-first century utopian solutions to 
capitalist decay, corporate oligarchy and environmental 
calamity are rarely rooted in the unequal power 
imbalances of everyday politics. As Claeys (2016: 
495) argues, “most dystopias today take us into the 
future without substantial explanations as to how we 
have descended into the dismal state we encounter”. 
In so far as resistance is depicted, dystopias typically 
place their best bet on the fate of small groups of 
activists and survivors. The focus is less often placed 
on grotesque structural inequalities than on heroic and 
resourceful individuals possessed of a peerless survival 
instinct. 
Feminist literary dystopias have explored the 
relationship between anxieties about reproduction, 
technology and power imbalances since at least Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) and Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman’s Herland (1915). Feminist utopias or dystopias 
include Ursula K. Le Guin’s ‘ambiguous utopia’, The 
Dispossessed (1974), Marge Piercy’s Woman on 
the Edge of Time (1976), and Margaret Atwood’s 
The Handmaid’s Tale (1985). The hugely successful 
television adaptation of The Handmaid’s Tale (2017-
2019) oscillates ambiguously between the cruel 
optimism of the merciless, resourceful heroine, June, 
who will do whatever it takes to destroy the dictatorship 
of Gilead, and the necessary pessimism required for 
the struggle to reach utopia (Canada). 
The balance more often tilts in favour of what Lauren 
Berlant (2011) called the ‘cruel optimism’ of struggling 
Alex and his droogs in the film dystopia of A Clockwork Orange
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for a constantly deferred, unattainable goal. For Mark 
Fisher (2009), the film adaptation of P.D. James’ (1992) 
feminist dystopia, Children of Men (Cuaron, 2006), 
marked a qualitative shift in dystopian narratives. 
Instead of functioning as a catalyst for imagining a 
coherent alternative to the present, Children of Men 
projects an image of what Fisher calls ‘capitalist 
realism’. In the child-less world of the film nothing 
new can possibly be born. Capitalist realism can only 
promise more and more of the same meaningless 
residue of vicarious consumption, “when beliefs have 
collapsed at the level of ritual or symbolic elaboration, 
and all that is left is the consumer-spectator, trudging 
through the ruins and the relics” (Fisher, 2009: 4). 
With a recurring focus on the cruel optimism of 
competitive resilience of individuals, dystopian films 
mirror the neoliberal ideal of human capital attuned to 
the uncertainties and insecurities of market turbulence. 
Individualised survival strategies of the precarious 
working class in post-2008 crisis films In Time (Niccol, 
2011), The Hunger Games (Ross, 2012) and Elysium 
(Blomkamp, 2013), Gregory Frame (2019) argues, 
merely reproduce a debilitating form of human 
capital. As resourceful individuals strive to achieve a 
life worth living, it is one that is constantly frustrated 
and denied by the worsening inequities and cut-
throat competition of crisis-soaked neoliberal political 
economy. Conversely, flawed individuals are doomed 
to fail. In the case of Joker (Philips, 2019), Arthur Fleck’s 
lonely descent into murderous psychosis follows from 
the consequences of unrelieved personal humiliations 
at the same time as his medical support is withdrawn 
thanks to funding cutbacks.
Despite this, utopia is typically modelled on small-
scale, communitarian village societies and dystopia on 
a large-scale surveillance society. A number of films 
from the late 1990s – Pleasantville (Ross, 1998), The 
Truman Show (Weir, 1998), Dark City (Proyas, 1998) and 
The Matrix (Wachowski and Wachowski, 1999) – depict 
artificially constructed worlds operating behind the 
backs of the protagonists. While these worlds offer 
a false complicity with a secure but banal utopian 
life, Peter Fitting (2003) argues that only Pleasantville 
challenges the popular idea of a hidden conspiracy 
of sinister forces manipulating everything behind the 
scenes.
 
What Orwell in 1984 called ‘groupthink’ is represented 
as a prison-house for expressing ‘authentic’ 
individuality, exacerbated today by the intensities and 
sensitivities of social media as well as manipulated 
realities. Groups themselves take on a dystopian 
tinge, beset by internal competitive struggles for 
social standing, and where “the less successful, always 
resentful of those who surpass them, will employ 
gossip, bickering, backbiting, innuendo, and sabotage 
to try to reduce their enemies back to the average level 
or lower (Claeys, 2011: 41)”. 
Fearful or wishful, feasible or fantastic utopias?
Over the past fifty years or so dystopias have often 
been defined by generalised criteria of neo-fascism, 
authoritarianism and violent illiberalism in Hollywood 
films ranging from The Wild Bunch (Peckinpah, 1969), 
Straw Dogs (Peckinpah, 1970), Dirty Harry (Siegel, 
1972), Rambo (Cosmatos, 1985), Se7en (Fincher, 1995), 
Natural Born Killers (Stone, 1994), Kalifornia (Sena, 
1993), and Starship Troopers (Verhoeven, 1997). What 
these and many other films show are some of the 
difficulties in defining dystopia as a genre distinct from 
other genres to which it may be interrelated, such as 
science fiction, musicals, thrillers, film noir, and so on. 
More stringent definitions of film utopia as a distinct 
genre typically depend on detailed depictions of 
social and political organisation associated with literary 
utopias in the form established by More.
Other-worldliness on its own is insufficient grounds 
for constituting utopia-dystopia. For instance, Wegner 
(2003) classifies Ghost Dog (Jarmusch, 1999) and 
Fight Club (Fincher, 1999) as ‘naturalistic dystopias’. 
Set in post-industrial urban wastelands, both films, 
Wegner argues, appeal to a nostalgic longing for 
village-style utopia while recognising the limits of 
its stagnant cohesion of communitarianism and 
repressive identities no longer thought worth saving. 
Although both films meditate on class and gender 
anxieties, neither transcends the ‘resigned pessimism’ 
of naturalistic dystopias that, in the end, nothing 
much can be changed. On the other hand, a strain of 
naturalistic and magic realist films, from Rome Open 
City (Rossellini, 1945) to Land and Freedom (Loach, 
1995) and Pan’s Labyrinth (del Torro, 2006), do in fact 
posit political resistance to the nightmare conditions 
of dystopian fascist tyranny. Such films pass through 
what Tom Moylan (2000: 195) called the ‘necessary 
pessimism’ of dystopia by an explicit refusal of 
complicity with the anti-utopian temptation to passively 
indulge in the empty pleasures of nihilism. 
Addressing dystopia as a critical utopia, as a necessary 
pessimism and not merely a positive utopia, Schulzke 
(2014) argues that virtual dystopias challenge existing 
institutions and ideologies more effectively than 
traditional media. Game dystopias are designed 
to be more dynamic than literary or film dystopias, 
enabling players to become active participants in 
Ofelia resists 'dystopian fascist tyranny through her adventures in 
the fantasy world of Pan’s Labyrinth
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creating or reproducing dystopian scenarios. A game 
like BioShock follows the descent into dystopia of an 
Ayn Rand-style utopia, the underwater city of Rapture, 
inhabited by a world elite of leaders, entrepreneurs, 
artists, and intellectuals given free rein to pursue their 
individualistic appetites unhindered (Aldred and 
Greenspan, 2011). Since games constrain and guide 
players they are compelled to actively reproduce 
the inescapable contradictions of deeply troubled 
worlds. This arguably stands in contrast to positive 
utopian games like The Sims where gameplay tends 
to uncritically mirror the real world, for instance by 
accumulating consumer goods and erasing unequal 
original starting positions in social space.
Claeys does not discuss videogame dystopias and 
offers only a brief digression on film dystopias, 
which he judges as inferior to literary dystopias. Film 
is primarily a simplistic form of entertainment that 
subordinates plot and character to action and visual 
effect. At the more serious end of film dystopias, Claeys 
concedes, are literary adaptations and documentaries. 
Contemporary audiences, Claeys assumes without 
further ado, are “jaded by computer gaming” and are 
even more inured to simulated violence than film and 
television audiences.
 
Against the grain of categorising the film utopia-
dystopia continuum as a fixed genre appealing to a 
predetermined audience segment, it may be more 
useful to begin from the working model of utopia 
developed by the sociologist Norbert Elias (1982). 
Elias’s model includes both wishful utopias and fearful 
utopias, and hybrid combinations. Utopia represents 
a fantasy image of the hopes or fears of the possible 
consequences of acute but unresolved human 
problems, tensions and conflicts. Here the focus is on 
collective fantasy images of social relations and the 
state rather than idiosyncratic fantasy images of lone 
individuals. A public must exist that responds to the 
desires or fears of utopia and the form of symbolic 
communication. To prevent the concept of utopia 
from becoming too unwieldy and wide-ranging, and 
therefore being unable to fulfil its specific function as 
a means of human orientation, Elias was determined 
to ground utopia in fantasy images of present-day or 
future terrestrial societies and excluded fantastic and 
extra-terrestrial images of utopia.
As someone concerned to situate human societies in 
long-term perspective, Elias was alert to the increasing 
scope for the feasibility for human society to realise 
utopian plans and engage in social experiments and 
technological innovation in contrast to the impossibility 
of Thomas More’s utopia five hundred years earlier. 
Utopia should no longer be understood in the 
pejorative sense of an unrealistic or illusory state of 
affairs. Yesterday’s improbable utopia may become 
tomorrow’s self-evident routine. Contemporary utopias 
must allow for this ambiguity. On the other hand, with 
current hype of AI, machine learning and robotics, 
prophetic technological futures are projected that may 
never happen, or at least not in the ways envisaged. 
Sharply uneven discrepancies between the level of 
control of nature, of each other, and of the self, lowers 
the threshold for collective uncertainty, fears and 
threats. In reality, Elias argued, the growing chain of 
social interdependencies has made global solidarity 
a more realistic prospect for humanity yet a deeply 
felt loss of security, stability and certainty restricts the 
emotional solidarity of people to more familiar sites of 
local and national identifications. 
While it is unnecessary to exclude images of extra-
terrestrial and past societies as obstacles to human 
action, Elias provides a useful model for plotting the 
scope of film utopia-dystopias. Fig 1 opposite is a tool 
to trigger debate about where different films, television 
series and videogames might be plotted along a 
‘feasible-fantastic’ axis and a ‘fear-wish’ axis. More 
ambiguous utopias will prove harder to place while 
feasible and fantastic fear-images are plentiful. For 
instance, does Zootopia (Howard and Moore, 2016), an 
animated Disney movie aimed at children where the 
individual prejudices and vices of anthropomorphised 
non-human animals are triumphantly overcome and 
cultural diversity celebrated, represent a feasible or a 
fantastic wish image? An obvious point of comparison 
is Animal Farm (Bachelor and Halas, 1954), Orwell’s 
dystopian parable about the degeneration of the 
Bolshevik Revolution. Secretly funded by the CIA, the 


















Fig 1: Plotting Films as Feasible-Fantastic and Fear-Wish Images
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film adaptation was transformed into fearful Cold War 
propaganda, complete with a new political ending 
more congenial to US ideologists. Orwell’s necessary 
pessimism was transformed into the CIA’s cruel 
optimism as a matter of strategic policy.
Dystopia as morbid symptom
By putting crises into sharper relief, film dystopias 
potentially possess an inestimable survival value. 
Dystopian films may reflect the sense of a threatening 
world at the same time as expressing an incapacity for 
changing it. Gramsci (1971: 276) famously argued that 
a wide variety of ‘morbid symptoms’ appear when a 
social order in crisis is dying but a new one cannot be 
born. Clearly, there is no shortage of morbid symptoms 
and unhinged monstrosities in circulation today. By 
raising unresolved questions utopia assists in the birth 
of social knowledge about latent possibilities that were 
only implicitly or vaguely grasped beforehand. Utopia-
dystopia performs a maieutic function when older 
standards no longer fit the world quite so seamlessly 
yet new standards cannot be explicitly articulated. 
In some ways this diagnosis is reminiscent of what 
Walter Benjamin (1931) called ‘left-wing melancholy’. 
Benjamin’s target was a self-satisfied, regressive cultural 
fixation on long abandoned utopias as the European 
crisis of the early 1930s surged towards disaster. It 
is also a condition found in the trauma experienced 
by left-wing intellectuals with illusions that the Soviet 
Union represented a fully human future until its 
unceremonious collapse in 1989. With the crisis of 
neoliberalism and fears of revanchist populism, the 
melancholic posture has spread more widely than 
small circles of fellow travellers. Feeling threatened on 
all sides, cultural spectatorship magnifies the imagery 
of dystopian breakdown. Constantly crying wolf by 
exaggerating the imminent threat to survival of each 
and every event and personality paradoxically invites 
complacency about deeper structural crises and 
creates a false sense of confidence that things will be 
turn out alright in the end.
Dystopias are not simply premonitions of impending 
catastrophe or mass violence. They respond to 
widespread feelings of relatively low levels of 
human control over social and natural processes, the 
persistence of social myths, and uncertainty about the 
future. Fears, well founded or not, are imaginatively 
heightened and relieved by emotionally satisfying 
images. Paradoxically, the distended appetite for 
cathartic fear images emerges as social relations 
have become more pacified, impersonal and 
interdependent. Fear-images, either of too much or too 
little external regulation, allow people to experience a 
‘controlled de-controlling’ of emotionally demanding 
forms of self-regulation, pacification and security. 
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